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556 illustrate that this distinction is recognized not only within
472 the community but by outside authorities.

556 a) A tribesman of the Beni Said had migrated to Alhucemas
485 and worked for Spaniards during the Protectorate. He
472 had purchased the hotel of a Spaniard when the latter
[275] sold on the eve of national independence. While it is
[784] illegal for a Muslim to operate a bar, he continued to
do so with tacit approval from local officials. He
opened several other enterprises accommodating Berber
transients and Western tourists. Although he came from
a poor family he had accumulated considerable capital.
However, his values were oriented almost entirely to
city life and he visited his tribe only once or twice
a year. He did not attempt to translate any of his
economic power into social status in his tribe. When
an European-sponsored hotel opened in the city, the
management regarded this entrepreneur as a competitive
threat (he was underselling the new hotel by 50%).
They complained to the police (it was rumored that
generous bribes were offered and accepted) and they
promptly closed the Riffian's bar. He complained to
the Ministry of Interior in Rabat and was told he could
reopen once the tourist season was over.

556 b) A Berber of the Beni Wariyaghar was the son of a
prominent man who had sided with the Spanish against
Ab-del Krim. The man, although he held political office

256 the mill collects a tenth of all the flour he processes, regard-
435 less of the level of demand or any market condition. While mills
472 are not economically competitive with one another, they are soci-
256 ally competitive. As one informant put it: "My father was better
472 than his, my grandfather better than his grandfather. If he has
477 a mill, why shouldn't we?" If there is only one mill in a local-
ity, which is a fairly rare circumstance, the entire community
uses it. However, if there are two or more mills, the basis of
[571] preference on the part of the users is not determined by conveni-
[578] ence of location of the mill but in terms of social factors such
[602] as either ancient antagonisms stemming from the blood feuds of
the past or familial alliance based on marriage or kinship.

423 Just as social motives and strictures lie behind the uses
429 of capital, so too do they influence the regulation of labor.
We see this in a series of sharecropping associations which arise
between a man who has more property than he alone can personally
cultivate (or who is prohibited from manual labor by his social
and/or religious status, such as some shorfa) and a person who
holds less land than he can cultivate to meet the subsistence
needs of his family. The latter may or may not be a property
holder, although usually he does have a small plot of his own.
Land fragmentation through the peculiarities of Islamic inher-
itance has, however, reduced many plots to sizes too small to
meet such subsistence needs as a family requires. In these cir-
[464] cumstances the Riffian hires out to those who have managed to
keep larger estates or have acquired land through purchase.